Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest by Piar, Daniel F.
Volume 117 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 117, 
2012-2013 
6-1-2012 
Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest 
Daniel F. Piar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 DICK. L. REV. 139 (2012). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol117/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 




In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken inconsistent
approaches to the question of whether morality can be a legitimate
government interest sufficient to survive constitutional review. This
article identifies three such approaches: (1) cases where morality is not
considered as a legitimate government interest; (2) cases where morality
is a legitimate government interest; and (3) cases where the Supreme
Court has substituted its own moral judgment for those of the state actor
under review. None of these approaches is wholly satisfactory. This
article will argue that, in most cases, deferential review of morality-based
state action fosters moral diversity, which is a social good to be sought
through the law. In cases of certain minorities, however, a more
searching review is justified, and the expression of public morality
should be subordinated to the protection of minority rights.
I. INTRODUCTION
For at least the first century of American life, the validity of morals
legislation was taken for granted. Courts routinely upheld morals
legislation against constitutional challenges. Blasphemy could be
punished; prayer required of schoolchildren; sexuality regulated; and
other vices prohibited.2 Much of this legislation was based on "public
morality," that is, widely shared moral sentiment given the force of law.
But the deference given to these expressions of public morality was not
to last. Beginning around the early twentieth century, the courts,
1. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academics, Charlotte School of Law.
A.B., Harvard College, J.D., Yale Law School.
2. See generally Daniel F. Piar, Majority Rights, Minority Freedoms: Protestant
Culture, Personal Autonomy and Civil Liberties in Nineteenth-Century America, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 987 (2006); Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of
Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 403-04 (1963); Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality
and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JuRis. 65, 69-70 (2000); Kimberly A.
Hendrickson, The Survival of Moral Federalism, 96 THE PUB. INT. 101 (2002).
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particularly the Supreme Court, began to treat morals legislation
differently. In a variety of contexts, courts questioned public morality as
a basis for law: state-required displays of patriotism were forbidden;
3
laws regulating abortion and sexuality were invalidated;4 and moral
disapprobation was said to be an insufficient basis for legislation.5 At the
same time, vestiges of previous attitudes have remained. Although the
Court has struck down morally based laws, it has also limited the scope
of its decisions to preserve traditional mores against practices such as
polygamy, incest, and same-sex marriage.6 In some cases, the Court has
declared that the expression of public morality remains a legitimate state
interest justifying certain laws.7 In other cases, the Court has gone so far
as to substitute one moral view for another, striking down morals
8
legislation in the name of what arguably is an opposing moral view.
The picture that emerges from these decisions is a murky one from
the perspective of public morality. The question remains as to the extent
that public morality is a legitimate basis for law. Faced with this
question in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the Court seems to
have taken one of three approaches: (1) declared morality to be an
insufficient basis for law; (2) declared morality to be a permissible basis
for law; or (3) substituted one moral viewpoint for another. The result
has been jurisprudential inconsistency; a deep and lingering uncertainty
as to whether state action based on morality is permissible.
This article will argue that the Court's inconsistency with regard to
morals legislation ill serves the goals of a pluralistic, federalist society.
To the extent that the law prohibits morals legislation, it forecloses state
experimentation and stifles expressions of community values. This
prohibition has the effect of reducing moral diversity, which is a social
good that should be encouraged. The moral diversity that a robust
federalism would make possible has important implications in the
development of an individual and collective moral sense. Thus, this
article proposes that courts should treat the expression of morality as a
legitimate state interest for purposes of rational basis review. The net
effect of such treatment would be to allow greater moral pluralism in the
law; greater fidelity to federalism and democracy; a healthy public
discourse; and, ultimately, the development of morality itself.
3. See W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
4. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
6. See id. at 578.
7. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156-60 (2007).
8. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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II. MORALITY DEFINED
As a threshold matter, it will be useful to define morality because
this concept will be discussed throughout the article. The New Oxford
American Dictionary defines "moral" as "concerned with the principles
of right and wrong behavior."9  Richard Posner, writing in a legal
context, defines morality as "the set of duties to others ... that are
designed to check our merely self-interested, emotional or sentimental
reactions to serious questions of human conduct." 10 Michael Perry refers
to morality as "a system of normative commitments""1 and to moral
judgment as "a judgment about how some matter ought to be dealt with,
about how it is good or right or just to deal with some matter.,
12
Drawing from these definitions, and keeping in mind that "morality" is
difficult to define with precision, one might say, then, that morality is a
set of normative principles about: (1) how humans should properly
conduct themselves; and (2) how humans should treat one another,
whether acting singly or in the aggregate.
The second part of this definition is especially important to this
article. One might think of morals as a matter of personal conduct, but it
is also appropriate to think of morals as dictating how the State should
behave toward individuals. As this article will examine, in cases where
the Court has imposed its own moral views on the law, it has effectively
taken a normative position as to how the State should treat the individual
or groups of individuals. State action is frequently constrained by moral
principles. Thus, when this article refers to "morality," it may refer to
the normative dimension of individual behavior or to the normative
dimension of government behavior, depending on the context.
This article does not take a position on the substance or application
of any specific moral principles. Such a discussion is a matter for
democratic exploration. Nor does this article either advocate or decry the
use of law to enforce moral principles.' 3 The enforcement of moral
principles is also a question for the democratic process to unravel.
Instead, this article asserts that the judiciary should permit morality
9. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Erin McKean ed., 2d ed. 2005).
10. Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1637, 1639 (1998).
11. MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW 102 (1990).
12. Id. at95.
13. The most famous debate to date on the enforcement of moral principles is that
between H.L.A. Hart and Patrick Devlin. Compare PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT
OF MORALS (1959) (arguing that law should be used to enforce morals), with H.L.A.
HART, LAW LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963) (arguing that law should not be used to
enforce morals). For a more recent salvo in this debate, see ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING
MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1995) (arguing that law should be
used to enforce morals).
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based state action, regardless of whether the particular substantive results
are ultimately advisable.
This article will now proceed in three main parts. Part III offers a
brief discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, 14 a case that purported to
eliminate morals legislation. This article will argue that such a reading
of Lawrence is not a reasonable interpretation of the case and, indeed,
that the Court probably did not mean what it said about the role of
morality in legislation. This article highlights Lawrence to demonstrate
that the end of morals legislation is not truly upon us. Part IV will
describe the Supreme Court's three approaches toward morality as a
basis for legislation: (1) cases prohibiting it; (2) cases permitting it; and
(3) cases wherein the Court imposed its own view of morality in place of
local lawmakers' views. Part V will offer an argument for recognizing
morality as a legitimate state interest in lawmaking, while highlighting
the dangers to moral diversity posed by the constitutionalization of moral
questions. It will also discuss both the benefits of moral diversity and
some boundaries of this potential state interest. Part VI will offer some
concluding thoughts; in particular, that the expression of morality is a
legitimate state interest and that treating it as such will ultimately
advance the moral development of citizens and society.
III. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: NOT THE DEATH OF MORALS LEGISLATION
In Lawrence v. Texas,' 5 the Supreme Court sounded what some
have described as the death knell of morals legislation. Lawrence
involved a challenge to a Texas sodomy statute that criminalized certain
sexual acts between same-sex partners. The Texas appellate court had
upheld the Texas statute based on Bowers v. Hardwick,16 a 1986 case in
which the Supreme Court upheld a similar Georgia statute based in large
part on what it saw as the historic moral objections to sodomy. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate court's ruling in
Lawrence. In addition, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in
Lawrence, overruled Bowers. He relied in part on language from Justice
Stevens's dissent in Bowers to admonish that morality was an
insufficient basis for this legislation: "[As Justice Stevens wrote], '[T]he
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice. . . .' Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view,
14. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15. Id.
16. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here." 7 In
response, the dissent argued that the Court seemed to decree an end to all
morals legislation:
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens
that certain forms of sexual behavior are "immoral and
unacceptable"-the same interest furthered by criminal laws against
fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and
obscenity.... [The Court] effectively decrees the end of all morals
legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian
sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the
above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review. 
s
Some scholars analyzing the opinion have come to the same
conclusion.1 9  But there are reasons to think that the majority's
declaration was an overstatement and is not to be taken literally.
First, the Court itself sought to limit the scope of the Lawrence
holding. Seeming to backpedal after the passage quoted above, the
majority asserted that its opinion did not eliminate laws protecting
minors, guarding vulnerable persons, regulating "public conduct" or
prohibiting prostitution, nor did it sanction same-sex marriage:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are
entitled to respect for their private lives.
20
Thus, Justice Kennedy left open for regulation a territory that would
seem to be off-limits under a sweeping injunction against morals
legislation, which suggests that a total ban was not what the Court truly
had in mind.
17. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478
U.S. at 216); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Moral
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal
Protection Clause .... ).
18. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
19. See Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity Law as an
Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 CoMM. LAW & POL'Y 25, 69
(2004); see also Calvin R. Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny? 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 957-70 (2004).
20. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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Second, as will be discussed,21 Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion in
Gonzales v. Carhart,22 four years after Lawrence, in which he indicated
that Congress could ban partial-birth abortion based on the view that the
23procedure was morally repugnant. Justice Kennedy's opinion on
Gonzales may seem surprising in light of his majority opinion in
Lawrence, but it is another indication that even the Justice who wrote the
opinion did not mean for his words on morals legislation to be taken
literally.
Finally, the Court's declaration in Lawrence can be viewed as an
overstatement because it is practically impossible to divorce morality
from the law in any case. A long litany of regulation, in both criminal
and civil law, is morally grounded. In the criminal arena, proscriptions
against murder, rape, robbery, incest, bestiality and drug use, to name a
few, express society's moral sense that certain acts are intolerable. In
civil law, rules against fraud, breach, and negligence reflect society's
distaste for certain behaviors. Thus, when society believes that certain
behaviors should be prohibited, it uses law to bring about what it views
as morally correct or desirable actions or omissions.
24
For all these reasons, it seems like an oversimplification to say that
Lawrence requires an end to all morals legislation. Yet, it does raise the
question at the center of this article: is morality ever a legitimate state
interest sufficient to justify government action?
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MORALS LEGISLATION: WHAT COURTS Do
In examining the question of whether morality is a legitimate state
interest, it will be useful to survey how courts have treated this issue in
practice. The clear trend has been to constitutionalize the subject. That
is, courts generally analyze the legitimacy of morality-based state action
in terms of its constitutional permissibility, whether as a matter of equal
protection or substantive due process. The Supreme Court typically has
taken one of three approaches: (1) morality is rejected as a basis for state
action; (2) morality is accepted as a basis for state action; or (3) the court
substitutes its own moral views for those of the relevant state actor.
A. Cases Rejecting Morality as a Basis
A few cases have rejected morality as a basis for state action.
Illustrative of this approach is United States Department ofAgriculture v.
21. See infra Part IV.B.
22. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
23. See id. at 157-60; see also infra Part IV.B.
24. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 10, at 1694.
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Moreno,25 a 1973 case that did not rest entirely on moral grounds but
nonetheless set the stage for more explicit rejections of morality as a
basis for state action in later years. Moreno involved the Congressional
denial of federal food stamp eligibility to groups of persons living
together with at least one unrelated person.26 The Government had
initially raised a moral justification for the law, which the district court
rejected, and which the Government subsequently abandoned on
appeal.27 Nevertheless, the legislative history indicated that Congress
designed the law to exclude "hippies" and "hippie communes" from the
food stamp program.28 Whether the congressional intent behind the law
at issue in Moreno may be called a moral position or something else, the
Supreme Court would have none of it. "[I]f the constitutional conception
of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. 29
Regardless of the underlying reasons for Congress's anti-hippie stance,
the principle articulated in Moreno that seemingly moral positions cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest would reemerge in a more
obviously moral context in later cases.
Indeed, the principle articulated in Moreno was addressed over 15
years later in Romer v. Evans.30 In Romer, the Supreme Court addressed
the validity of Colorado's Amendment Two, which forbade laws
protecting homosexuals against discrimination. Citing Moreno, the
Court struck down the law and held that "[flaws of the kind now before
us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected.... A State cannot so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.' Justice Scalia, in
dissent, thought that the Court had rejected what was apparently an
expression of the State's moral position. "The Court has mistaken a
Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.... [Amendment 2 is) a modest
attempt... to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the
laws., 32 Thus, Moreno's prohibition of class-based animus was extended
to strike down an example of morals legislation, thereby implying that
25. U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
26. Id. at 529.
27. Id. at 535 n.7.
28. Id. at 534.
29. Id.
30. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
31. Id. at 634.
32. Id. at 636.
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morality, or at least certain types of morality, was not a permissible basis
for state action.
As previously mentioned, Lawrence v. Texas33 is arguably the
leading case for the proposition that public morality is an insufficient
basis for lawmaking. This is especially so in light of the fact that
Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,34 a 1986 case with nearly
identical facts. In Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sodomy
law and, in doing so, recognized morality as a legitimate state interest.
As Justice White described for the Bowers Court:
[Respondent argues that public morality is] an inadequate rationale to
support the [sodomy] law. The law, however, is constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts
will be very busy indeed. Even respondent makes no such claim, but
insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality
should be declared inadequate. We do not agree ....35
Lawrence repudiated this thinking, instead quoting and adopting Justice
Stevens' Bowers dissent. In his Bowers dissent, Justice Stevens
declared, "[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice ... "36
As previously noted, Lawrence's prohibition on the use of morality
as a legitimate government interest should not be taken too literally.3"
Nonetheless, other courts and commentators have cited the case
approvingly as a signal of the end of morals legislation. For example, in
United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc.,38 the Western District of
Pennsylvania struck down federal obscenity statutes. In Extreme
Associates, Inc., the court declared that the stated purpose of the statutes
was to "protect[] unwitting adults from exposure to obscene materials"
and was "grounded in the advancement of the public morality, which is
no longer a legitimate, let alone a compelling, state interest" after
Lawrence.39 Similarly, in Martin v. Ziherl,4 ° the Virginia Supreme Court
33. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
34. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
35. Id. at 196.
36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
37. See supra Part II1.
38. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
39. Id. at 594. Note, however, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's ruling, holding that the commerce power allows Congress to
prevent the use of commerce as "an agency to promote immorality." U.S. v. Extreme
Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d. Cir. 2005) (quoting U.S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 144
n.6 (1973)). The Third Circuit essentially ignored the implications of Lawrence in favor
of more specific precedent on the issue of obscenity. See id
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drew on the holding of Lawrence to declare the Virginia fornication
statute unconstitutional. The court noted that, after Lawrence, moral
disapproval of a practice is an insufficient basis for state action.4' Some
academic commentary has been in the same vein.42
Collectively, these cases and their progeny stand for the proposition
that the expression of morality is not a legitimate government interest.
However, other lines of cases have seemingly repudiated this stance, as
this article shall discuss next.
B. Cases Accepting Morality as a Basis
While Lawrence, Moreno, and Romer seem to reject the idea of
morality as a legitimate government interest, a number of cases signal the
opposite view. These include cases in the context of obscenity,
pornography, sexual conduct, and abortion.
Obscenity is a prime example of how the Supreme Court has
recently allowed morality to influence the law. Regulations and statutes
regarding obscenity have traditionally had a moralistic tone,43 one that
the Supreme Court has seemingly endorsed throughout its free speech
jurisprudence. The Court directly addressed whether obscenity was
entitled to constitutional protection in the jointly decided Roth v. United
States and Alberts v. California.44 In Roth, the Court upheld the validity
of a federal statute criminalizing the mailing of "[e]very obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print,
or other publication of an indecent character. 'A5 In Alberts, the Court
also upheld a California statute prohibiting obscenity, which was defined
as material having "a substantive tendency to deprave or corrupt its
readers by exciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desire. ' '4 The
moral implications of such words as "filthy," "deprave," and "corrupt"
seem clear; it therefore appears that the Court at least implicitly upheld
the moral position of these statutes.
In a later obscenity case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,47 the
Supreme Court openly endorsed the moral component of obscenity law:
40. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).
41. See id. at 371.
42. See sources cited supra note 19.
43. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1635 (2005); David A. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:
Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974-75);
Henkin, supra note 2, at 391.
44. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
45. Id. at 479 n.l.
46. Id. at 499 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
People v. Wepplo, 178 P.2d 853 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1947)).
47. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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"In an unbroken series of cases extending over a long stretch of this
Court's history it has been accepted as a postulate that 'the primary
requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications. ' '48  The Court's opinion also noted with regard to
obscenity:
[There] are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity .... These include the interest of the
public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the
tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public
safety itself ... As Chief Justice Warren stated, there is a "right of
the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society.
' 49
Thus, in Paris, The Court upheld regulation in the name of "decency."
The Paris case marks a continuance in the Court's endorsement of
morality as a basis for legislation, at least in the context of sexual mores.
In the years after Roth and Alberts, the definition of "obscenity"
remained notoriously elusive with legislators and courts following
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's notorious "I know it when I see
it" test for obscenity. 50 As a result of this difficulty, in Miller v.
California,51 the Supreme Court adopted what remains the current test
for obscenity--one that recognizes a role, albeit a bounded one, for local
expressions of morality. The three-part Miller test for obscenity is as
follows:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
52
The first and second prongs of the Miller test permit the possibility of
local moral variation. Community standards are relevant under the first
prong, whereas state definitions of prohibited sexual conduct are relevant
under the second prong. Furthermore, the second prong also envisions
the role that a local jury will play in determining whether the depictions
at issue are "patently offensive." Thus, there is a role for local moral
attitudes in the regulation of obscenity; however, the author does not
intend to overstate the case. The third prong, the Court has held, is an
48. Id. at 57 (quoting Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
49. Id. at 57-60 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, J.,
dissenting)).
50. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
51. Millerv. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
52. Id. at 24.
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objective one;53 moreover, verdicts under the Miller test are subject to
judicial review to ensure that overly sensitive juries do not employ some
unspecified standard of hypersensitivity in declaring material obscene.54
But in its structure and operation, the Miller test does indicate that what
is morally repugnant in one community may not be in another, and the
test permits obscenity standards to be adjusted, albeit within limits, to
local moral reactions.
The so-called "secondary effects" cases also display a permissive
attitude toward regulation based on local morality. The "secondary
effects" cases involve the Supreme Court upholding laws regulating
adult entertainment-typically theaters and bookstores purveying
pornographic material. Such laws sometimes restrict adult entertainment
venues to certain areas of town, or zone them away from residential
areas, bars, and hotels. The standard theory behind such ordinances is
that an adult entertainment establishment "tends to attract an undesirable
quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values,
causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages
residents and businesses to move elsewhere."55  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has upheld municipal statutes and regulations seeking to
prevent such "secondary effects," so long as these statutes or regulations
are content-neutral, meaning they do not directly regulate the content of
the underlying speech.5 6  Although the secondary-effects doctrine is
supposedly content-neutral, at least one Supreme Court Justice has
recognized such an application of the "content-neutral" label is
"something of a fiction., 57 At bottom, such laws surely proceed from
moral objections to the business of pandering sex. The judicial
allowance of morality-influenced zoning decisions, albeit under the guise
of content-neutrality, represents a tacit endorsement of the enactment of
local moral standards into law.
The presence of morality in the context of "secondary effects" laws
was highlighted in Barnes v. Glen Theater,58 in which a plurality of three
Supreme Court Justices applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold a state
ban on public nudity as applied to nude dancing. Central to the
plurality's reasoning was its view that the law legitimately expressed a
moral position: "[T]he public indecency statute furthers a substantial
53. See Smith v. U.S., 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
54. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
55. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976); see also City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
56. Young, 427 U.S. at 62-63.
57. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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government interest in protecting order and morality. 59 Justice Scalia,
concurring, took a slightly more radical position, applying the lower
standard of rational basis review-analyzing whether the law was
rationally related to a legitimate government interest-and opining that
"[m]oral opposition to nudity supplies a rational basis for its
prohibition., 60 Notably, the four dissenters did not entirely dismiss the
possibility of morals legislation. Instead, they would have applied strict
scrutiny-analyzing whether the law serves a compelling government
interest-and overturned the statute because it targeted expressive
activity in particular, rather than nudity more generally. 6' Thus, in the
dissenters' view, "the plurality and Justice Scalia's simple references to
the State's general interest in promoting societal order and morality are
not sufficient justification for a statute which concededly reaches a
significant amount of protected expressive activity." 62 Although Barnes
did not generate a majority opinion, it is instructive for its recognition,
among all the Justices, that laws of this type do have a moral basis.
In Washington v. Glucksberg,63 the Supreme Court was more
explicit in its endorsement of morality as a basis for state action. In
Glucksberg, the Court upheld Washington's ban on the rendering of
assistance in committing suicide. The ruling was, in part, based on what
the Court perceived as society's moral disapproval of the act:
In almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-
it is a crime to assist a suicide. The States' assisted-suicide bans [are]
longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to the protection
and preservation of all human life. Indeed, opposition to and
condemnation of suicide-and, therefore, of assisting suicide-are
consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal and
cultural heritages.
64
Later in the opinion, the Court referred to the State's "unqualified
interest in the preservation of human life., 65 Thus, the Court did not use
the term "moral," but it clearly considered the State's moral concerns
59. Id. at 569 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). The wording of the statute at issue was not
particularly moralistic: "A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place: ...
(3) appears in a state of nudity ... commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor."
The term "nudity" was clinically defined as "the showing of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of
the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the
showing of the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state." Id. at 569 n.2.
60. Id. at 580.
61. See id. at 587-96.
62. Id. at 590.
63. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
64. Id. at 710-11.
65. Id. at 728 (quoting Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1989)).
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when evaluating the ban's validity. The Court's references to the
preservation of life, and its invocation of culture and philosophy, merely
skirted what seems apparent: the Court was permitting a moral stance
against suicide to stand as state law.
Finally, the Supreme Court's most recent abortion case also
demonstrates an approval of morals legislation. In Gonzales v.
Carhart,66 the Court upheld a Congressional ban on so-called "partial
birth" abortions. In an opinion laced with moral language, Justice
Kennedy expressed the majority's approval of Congress's disapproval of
the abortion techniques at issue. After a detailed and gruesome account
of the relevant medical procedures-which itself seemed designed to
reinforce the Court's negative moral attitude towards such procedures-
the Court addressed Congress's intent in prohibiting the procedures:
A description of the prohibited abortion procedure demonstrates the
rationale for the congressional enactment. The Act proscribes a
method of abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before
completion of the birth process. Congress stated as follows:
"Implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane procedure by
choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen society to the
humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent
human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life." The
Act expresses respect for the dignity of human life.
67
The Court then wrote, "[T]he government may use its voice and its
regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the
woman." 68 Aside from preventing the "coarsening" of attitudes toward
humanity and "respecting" the "dignity" of human life-two moral
positions if there ever were any-the law permissibly invoked a third
moral concern:
Congress could nonetheless conclude that the type of abortion
proscribed by the Act requires specific regulation because it
implicates additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a special
prohibition. Congress determined that the abortion methods it
proscribed had a "disturbing similarity to the killing of a newbom
infant," and thus it was concerned with "drawing] a bright line that
clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide."
The prevention of infanticide, or at least procedures resembling
infanticide, was another overtly moral position that the law permissibly
furthered.
66. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
67. Id. at 156.
68. Id. at 157.
69. Id. at 158.
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Finally, the Court held that the law served the moral purpose of
protecting a woman from trauma that could ensue if she were to learn
how her fetuses had been aborted:
The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice [as abortion] is
well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret
her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and
sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she
once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and
vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child
assuming the human form.
70
Gonzales thus acknowledged the permissibility of codifying several
moral judgments: the inhumanity of partial-birth abortions, the dignity
of human life, the prevention of infanticide or its look-alikes, and the
need to protect aborting mothers from emotional distress. The fact that
the Court upheld morals legislation only four years after its polar
decision in Lawrence, and that the same Justice authored the two
opinions, indicates that morals legislation is not so pass6 as some
observers might think.
C. The Judicial Substitution of Morality
At times, the Supreme Court has concluded that morality is a
sufficient basis for legislation, and, at other times, it has said just the
opposite. A third option occasionally used by the Court is the
substitution of the Court's own moral position for that of the state action
under review. This approach can be seen in a variety of individual rights
contexts, including privacy rights, First Amendment rights, and equal
protection rights. In these situations, the Court has taken its own stance
on what is right and wrong with respect to a particular state action. That
is, the Court has seemingly dictating how governments must behave
based on its own implicit or explicit notions of what is normatively right
or wrong for government to do.
This approach has not gone unnoticed. In a book-length treatment
of the issue, Stephen E. Gottlieb advances the idea that the Rehnquist
Court imposed an essentially right-wing morality on the nation."
Rejecting the principles of individual moral autonomy and the avoidance
of harm as grounds for review, the Justices, in Gottlieb's view, have
"substituted more personal views of a just world" by deciding cases in
70. Id. at 159-60.
71. STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND
LIBERTY IN AMERICA, 29, 34, 62 (2000).
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accordance with "conservative morality. 72  Similarly, Wojciech
Sadurski has identified the process of moral substitution at work on the
"liberal" side of the Court, particularly in the opinions of Justices
Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan in Furman v. Georgia.
73
Nevertheless, this article is focused less on the imposition of a particular
strain of morality and is instead concerned with the imposition of moral
standards generally, whether labeled as "liberal," "conservative," or
something else. It is the process of moral substitution itself that the
author hopes to emphasize, not the particular camp from which the
substitution originates.
Indeed, Gottlieb focuses on the imposition of "conservative
morality," but the practice of moral imposition is evident in some of the
Supreme Court's landmark "liberal" opinions. In privacy cases, one of
the early examples is Griswold v. Connecticut,74 in which the Court
struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives
as applied to married couples. The statute, which dated back to 1879,
71
was defended by the state as "a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power to regulate public morals" by preventing extramarital sex.76 The
Court rejected this argument in part by substituting its own moral stance
for that of the Connecticut legislature. Although much of the opinion
concerned the infamous "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of
Rights,77 the Court's conclusion centered on the sanctity of marriage. In
a passage with distinct moral overtones, Justice Douglas wrote:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.
78
In overturning the statute, the Court thus implicitly found that its moral
view of the sanctity of marriage overrode Connecticut's moral view that
fornication and adultery should be prevented.
72. Id.
73. Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L.
REV. 339 (1987) ("Justice Marshall's appeal to popular sentiment must, therefore, be seen
as a disguise for his own substantive morality.").
74. Griswold v. Connecticut, 38t U.S. 479 (t965).
75. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Brief for Appellee at 7-8, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 1965 WL 92620.
76. Brief for Appellee at 13, 15, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 1965
WL 92620.
77. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
78. Id. at 486.
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A similar dynamic influenced the Supreme Court eight years later in
Roe v. Wade.79 In Roe, the Court made a moral choice among the
conflicting claims of the unborn, the State, and the woman regarding an
abortion law. The Court expressly rejected the State's moral position
that life begins at conception and should be protected except to save the
life of the mother. "[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of
life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at
stake." 80 Opposed to Texas's view was another moral position: that the
woman's right to control her body precluded state intervention in the
abortion decision.8" The Court generally sided with the woman's
position, holding that the interests of the woman, at least for the first two
trimesters, outweighed the State's interest in fetal life. The Court also
held that a fetus was without rights in the matter because it was not a
legal "person." 82 Thus, the Court made a moral choice by throwing its
weight behind the moral position advanced by the plaintiffs. In other
words, the Court substituted its own moral views for those of the Texas
legislature.
This process of moral imposition continued in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,83 another Supreme Court abortion case. In Casey, the
Pennsylvania legislature had passed a set of five abortion restrictions,
some of which the Court upheld and others of which the Court struck
down. In its opinion, the Court began by reiterating the moral judgment
contained in Roe: "[The] essential holding [in Roe includes] a
recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the
State., 84 The Court went on to examine the concept of "liberty," which it
addressed in moral terms: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life.... The destiny of the woman must be shaped to
a large extent on her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. 85
The statement appears to be a moral proposition, denying the State the
ability to influence a woman's freedom to make choices about her mode
of living and her metaphysical obligations. This moral philosophizing
highlights the Court's willingness to deploy its own moral reasoning in
support of its judgments.
86
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. Id. at 162.
81. Id. at 129, 153.
82. Id. at 162.
83. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
84. Id. at 846.
85. Id. at 851-52.
86. It is significant in this context to note the erosion of the abortion right.
Beginning with Roe, which placed the first trimester off-limits to state regulation, the
[Vol. 117:1
MORALITY AS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST
The Supreme Court has not limited its morality-based approach to
decisions to abortion cases. In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,87 the Court addressed whether a state school board could
compel a student to salute the flag. Although the law at issue was not
necessarily morals-based, the Court's response set a moralizing tone for
adjudication that would resurface in later cases. In declining to uphold
the law, the Court relied on its own judgment that one's spiritual and
mental sanctity were more important than the instillation of patriotism.
"[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion, or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein ... [this law] invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit ... .,88 By setting up a spiritual barrier
to state action, the Court endorsed the essentially moral position that
certain realms of personal autonomy were off-limits to the State.
Fifty years later, in Lee v. Weisman,89 the Supreme Court struck
down the practice of non-sectarian prayer offered at a middle-school
graduation ceremony. Central to the Court's reasoning was its view that
the offering of the prayers put "subtle coercive pressure" on the students
either to stand in apparent assent or to sit in conspicuous disagreement.
9
0
Forcing schoolchildren to make this choice, the Court wrote, was an
"unacceptable constraint" in favor of state-enforced "orthodoxy." 91 In
line with this reasoning, the Court recalled Barnette's admonition against
compelled displays of obeisance. The Court seemed concerned about the
potential imposition of state-sponsored morality, though it failed to see
that it had also taken a moral position: that individual freedom of mind,
cast as freedom from embarrassment or difficult choices, is a good to be
valued more highly than the widely shared mores of a community. This
is also a moral "orthodoxy," although the Court would probably not
admit it.
Court next decided Casey, which said that the state could regulate from conception so
long as it did not impose an "undue burden" on the abortion decision. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992). Then, in Gonzales, the Court for the first
time upheld a ban on a particular abortion procedure, in the process lowering the standard
of review from Roe's (ostensibly) strict scrutiny to rational basis plus undue burden. See
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007). Therefore, one might wonder whether
abortion is truly a fundamental right any longer. If it is not, and given the moral freight
borne by Casey and Gonzales, one might well see this as a retrenchment of the abortion
right and a consequence of increasing moral unease on the Court, coupled with increasing
adjudicatory opportunities with respect to abortion.
87. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
88. Id. at 642.
89. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1991).
90. Id. at 592.
91. Id. at 594.
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Finally, in Romer v. Evans,92 the Court struck down a Colorado
constitutional amendment that would have denied special protections to
anyone based on sexual orientation. As Justice Scalia noted in his
dissent, the amendment was likely an expression of popular morality, an
attempt by Coloradoans to "preserve traditional sexual mores. 9 3
However, the majority of the Court, again led by Justice Kennedy,
refused to accede to that moral choice. Citing Moreno,94 the Court
concluded that the amendment was "born of animosity toward the class
of persons affected., 95 The amendment would have deprived gays and
lesbians of "protections against ... an almost limitless number of
transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free
society." 96 Such laws, the Court wrote, are "not within our constitutional
tradition., 97 In striking down the amendment, the Court made its own
moral choice. Running throughout the opinion is the assumption that our
"free society" and "constitutional tradition" should be construed to
prevent the hurtful exclusion of people based on sexual orientation. This
assumption is an essentially moral position that inverts the one taken by
Colorado's voters. 98
Thus, this article shows that the Supreme Court has taken varying
and conflicting positions on the role of morality as a legitimate state
interest. Next, this article will focus on the question of how courts
should approach the issue of morals legislation.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MORALS LEGISLATION: WHAT COURTS
SHOULD DO
Having examined the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of
morality as a basis for state action, this part will consider an alternative
approach. Standing on their own, each of Court's three approaches
seems to be unsatisfactory. The Court's blanket acceptance of morality
as a basis for state action raises the risk of enabling oppressive results
92. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
93. Id. at 636. Indeed, the leading proponents of the Colorado amendment have
been documented as supporting the law as an effort to preserve sexual mores. See Romer
v. Evans, DuKE UNIv. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.duke.edu/voices/romer# (last visited
Aug. 12, 2012).
94. U. S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
95. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
96. Id. at 631.
97. Id. at 633.
98. In this sense, the Court's ruminations on "free society" and "our constitutional
tradition" in Romer serve as a cover for substantive moral choice. See, e.g., Sadurski,
supra note 73, at 395 ("Those who tell us what 'the teaching of our tradition is' appeal
usually to a teaching of our tradition (not necessarily the prevailing one) which they
happen to endorse.").
[Vol. 117:1
MORALITY AS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST
and the possibility of tyranny of the majority. The substitution of
morality makes the Court a moral arbiter, a role for which it is ill
suited.99 Furthermore, the rejection of morality as a basis for lawmaking
seems potentially undemocratic and unduly dismissive, at least for a
democratic society, of the desires of communities to assert their
collective standards of behavior.
For these reasons, some alternative, or middle ground, among these
three approaches should exist. This article will argue that the best
approach gives communities free rein to express their moral beliefs in
legal terms, but only to a certain point. In brief, this next part proposes
that courts should treat morality as a legitimate state interest, applying
rational basis review to morality-based state action except when it
threatens a "discrete and insular minority" or the political process
itself. 100
A. In Praise of Moral Diversity
Why should courts treat morality as a legitimate basis for state
action? One answer is that enabling morals legislation will yield
particular moral results that are of substantive benefit to individuals and
society. 10 1 Another answer is that judicial restraint in this area will
support democracy by allowing majorities to have their way. Scholars
have also argued that legislatures are inherently more competent to
discern and implement public morality than judges, at least where the
judges are unelected. 10 2 Notwithstanding these are legitimate arguments,
this article will explore a different justification for the state interest in
morality: it fosters moral pluralism, or what the author calls "moral
diversity." Central to this article is the idea that moral diversity is a
benefit to be pursued in society and in law.
The existence of differing moral views is one of the essential traits
of modern American society. As stated by Andrei Marmor, pluralism is
"the most significant moral aspect of the social-political world we live
in.' 0 3  The reasons for honoring pluralism are many, and any
constitutional regime that does not facilitate pluralism is seriously
99. For an exposition of this charge, see ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE AGE OF
PLURALISM 109-10 (2007); see also Posner, supra note 10, at 1709.
100. Footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938), gave rise to the possibility of various levels of review for laws and their purported
underlying state interests. For more on footnote four from Carolene Products, see infra
Part V.C.
101. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 13.
102. See, e.g., Sadurski, supra note 73, at 350 ("[T]he presumption that, by and large,
legislators are responsive to the moral sentiments in the community seems well
founded.").
103. MARMOR, supra note 99, at vii.
2012]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
flawed, if not illegitimate. 104 In reviewing the reasons for encouraging
moral diversity, we can better understand some of the consequences of
this social good for the judicial review of morality-based state action.
One reason to respect moral diversity is the basic commitment of
liberalism to a robust pluralism. "[I]t has been the benchmark of
liberalism for centuries that there is a sense in which value pluralism, and
not just plurality, is reasonable."'' 0 5 If, under the influence of liberalism,
we recognize the equality of individuals, freedom of thought, and
freedom of speech, it is inevitable that moral disagreement will arise.
Indeed, "moral and practical disagreement seems endemic to the human
condition."'10 6 Given the inevitability of such pluralism, liberalism seeks
to foster, not impede, moral disagreement. This is especially true in a
system where consent governs citizens rather than fiat, where citizens
seek to operate by reason rather than by revelation. "Founded on consent
rather than on a content-full account of moral rationality, limited
democracies are morally constrained, not to be committed to all-
encompassing, content-full accounts of justice, fairness, and/or
equality.' 0 7 Thus, "rightly understood, liberalism is about the protection
of diversity."' 08 Liberalism is not about the promotion of homogeneity in
matters so squarely touching human independence and dignity.
Aside from honoring our liberal commitments, moral diversity can
benefit society and individuals. Moral diversity can contribute to the
solution of social problems, giving society a kind of hybrid vigor that is
practically useful in overcoming obstacles. Warning against what he
calls "the perils of uniformity," Judge Richard Posner writes:
[G]iven the variety of necessary roles in a complex society, it is not a
safe idea to have a morally uniform population.... We need kind,
gentle and sensitive people, but we also need people who are willing
to employ force, to lie, to posture, to break rules, to enforce rules, to
fire people, to rank people.... A uniform judiciary would not be a
national disaster; moral uniformity might well be.
10 9
Amelie Rorty echoes Judge Posner's point: "Lacking the kind of variety
on focus and in action-guiding priorities that most problem solving
104. See generally id. ch. 4.
105. Id. at 45.
106. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law's Limited Domain Confronts
Morality's Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1579, 1583 (2007).
107. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Injustice of Enforced Equal Access to
Transplant Operations: Rethinking Reckless Claims of Fairness, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
256, 262 (2007).
108. William A. Galston, The Legal and Political Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57
MD. L. REv. 236 (1998).
109. Posner, supra note 10, at 1681-82.
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requires, a homogeneous culture would have great difficulty managing
its practical affairs."110 In other words, a society made exclusively of
saints could not thrive any more than one made exclusively of sinners.
The entire spectrum of human proclivities must be tapped to meet the
demands of a complex world.
Moral diversity is also a relatively safe option in a world where we
have learned that ideology can be dangerous. The pluralism offered by
moral diversity may reduce the risk of moral or social error. Simply put,
the more moral views there are, the less likely an all-encompassing
morality might overtake society that is erroneous or unworkable. As
Robert Cover explains, "If there were a unitary source for norm
articulation over a given domain, the costs of error or lack of wisdom in
any norm articulation would be suffered throughout the domain.""' That
is, the more we centralize morality, the more entrenched and far-reaching
our mistakes will be. A morally diverse environment can minimize this
risk and maintain a balance between the proponents and opponents of
any controversial moral principle. "The multiplicity of centers means an
innovation is more likely to be tried and correspondingly less likely to be
wholly embraced. The two effects dampen both momentum and
inertia.""' 2  Society, therefore, can keep a relatively even keel while
simultaneously searching for generally acceptable truths.
Moral diversity can likewise stabilize society by allowing the
expression, rather than the suppression or repression, of inevitably
divergent moral views. Justice Scalia has recognized this phenomenon
in case law concerning the abortion debate. In a prominent dissenting
opinion, Justice Scalia notes that the federalization of the abortion debate
fanned the flames of conflict by polarizing the population, rather than by
leaving people to work out their differences through the democratic
processes of compromise and conciliation." 13 Moral diversity can ease
such conflicts by enabling all to be heard and to feel that they have had a
hand in public decision-making. Thus, as Kimberly Hendrickson states,
"We should be grateful to moral federalism as a vent for frustration."' '
14
Failure to provide such a vent can escalate conflict, leading to division or
worse. "If... reasonable citizens are routinely thwarted in public
decisions on matters deeply important to them, they may adopt
110. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, The Advantages of Moral Diversity, 9 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y 38, 43 (1992).
111. Robert Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 673 (1981).
112. Id. at 674.
113. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
114. Hendrickson, supra note 2, at 109.
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increasingly unreasonable strategies of resistance, or simply opt for exit,
forging instead their own just polity in which their political conception of
justice is authoritative." '1 15 Alternatively, instead of making a peaceful
exit, frustrated people may decide that other, more harmful forms of
action are required. The official centralization of morality "cuts off
deliberation and debate ... makes compromise impossible, and...
eliminates political solutions and thereby drives opponents of the
decision to non-political 'direct action."" 1 6  One must only think of
violence at abortion clinics or clashes between police and demonstrators
in the Occupy movement to realize the perils of this course. Better to
tolerate what William Galston calls "the messiness of politics," thereby
avoiding "a pernicious legalism that absolutizes competing claims and
creates winner-take-all outcomes.""
7
In addition to tempering frustrations, moral diversity can stave off
conflict by moderating our expectations of society and its constituent
groups. Those who accept that moral difference is a reality are less
likely to become upset or alienated when their views fail to carry the day.
Instead, this outcome can be accepted as an incident of a morally diverse
populace. "[A]t least some principles are best left ambiguous, and some
crucial moral and ethical conflicts are best understood, and best
arbitrated, as failures of practical cooperation rather than as
disagreements about the truth of certain general propositions or
theories." ' 1 8  Indeed, the acceptance of moral diversity provides a
realistic basis on which to found society:
The quest for agreement on a conception of the good (the aim, e.g., of
some communitarian theories) underestimates the significance and
legitimate persistence of fundamental moral disagreement. In a
pluralist society, comprehensive moral theories neither can nor
should win the agreement of all citizens. A public philosophy for
such societies must reject the unqualified quest for agreement
because it must renounce the claim to comprehensiveness."
9
115. Loren A. King, The Federal Structure of a Republic of Reasons, 33 POL. THEORY
629, 649 (2005); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in
Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1540 (1989) (book
review) (describing Roe v. Wade as a decision "that cuts off deliberation and debate, that
makes compromise impossible, and that eliminates political solutions and thereby drives
opponents of the decision to non-political 'direct action').
116. McConnell, supra note 115, at 1540.
117. Galston, supra note 108, at 244.
118. Rorty, supra note 110, at 38.
119. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Consensus,
101 ETHIcs 64, 86 (1990).
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A "public philosophy" that anticipates and embraces disagreement is
likely to be more durable and flexible than one that seeks to achieve an
unrealistic uniformity.
Moral diversity can also enhance interpersonal and inter-group
relationships by encouraging respect for others. The continued
encountering of moral perspectives different from one's own can force a
reevaluation of one's position, thereby fostering an increased regard for
those who differ from oneself. "[O]pen discussion of differences of
opinion.., is the best cure for the fallibility of narrow dogmatism; it
presses for the refinement of crude and imprecise beliefs."'12' For this
reason, "enhanced interpersonal respect ... tends to result from exposure
to moral complexities.'' Such respect is more than mere toleration: "It
requires a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with,
the persons with whom one disagrees."'
2 2
These kinds of "constructive interactions" can be of benefit in
seeking and deciding on a shared course of action in a society. "[T]he
very nature of reasonable disagreement... encourages vigorous debate
that will likely challenge settled convictions about rights and the
character of the public sphere within each distinctive community of
reasonable beliefs.' 23 Such debate does a great deal to temper opposing
views and to bring about support for the practical decisions that society
must make about how citizens will govern themselves. "It is not only
possible for various moral positions to co-exist, it is preferable. Without
such friction, social reform would be impossible."'' 24 Morally tolerant
interaction can therefore guide society toward making the substantive
moral choices that are necessary in a polity. "Mutual respect makes
possible, at the level of political decision, the deliberate choice of
substantive moral values for the society as a whole."'
125
At the same time that moral diversity promotes social goods, it can
also enhance individual moral development. Contact with other moral
beliefs in an atmosphere of mutual respect breeds moral insight. As
explained by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, "[M]utual respect
supports a political process that promotes moral learning. Citizens put
their moral beliefs to the test of public deliberation and strengthen their
convictions or change their minds in response to the arguments in which
120. Rorty, supra note 110, at 52.
121. Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
841, 854 (2002).
122. Gutmann and Thompson, supra note 119, at 76.
123. King, supra note 115, at 646.
124. Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics:
Regulations Banning Sex Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 33 (2000).
125. Id. at 77.
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they engage under conditions governed by the principles of
accommodation.' ' 26 This process of moral learning in turn promotes
individual moral virtue:
[M]utual respect can contribute not only to social good but also to
individual virtue. Persons who practice mutual respect are disposed
against the premature moral skepticism, and the concomitant ennui
and indecision, that afflict those who treat the existence of conflicting
opinions as proof of the arbitrariness of all moral judgments....
They are also less inclined toward moral dogmatism, and its
accompanying anger and arrogance, that is common among those
who treat moral disagreement as a sure sign of the ignorance or
depravity of their opponents. 1
27
In addition to making people less dogmatic, moral diversity can help
them achieve self-actualization. Reed Elizabeth Loder explains: "Moral
diversity is a potential pathway to personal betterment. This
developmental stake helps to ensure that changes in attitudes are not easy
or arbitrary fluctuations, but well-examined steps toward a higher image
of self. A personal search for moral wisdom drives the ideal process."
128
In other words, exposure to other moral ideas, with an accompanying
introspection, can aid the search for personal growth.
Moral diversity therefore offers the benefits of realism, toleration,
political stability, and individual development. For all of these reasons,
"Moral cultivation in a liberal state cannot insist on a uniform
morality.' ' 29  This sentiment should caution against the process of
judicial moralizing as opposed to judicial deference.
One might argue that, if moral diversity is such an important good,
citizens should not tolerate any codification of morality. Surely, a local
legislative enactment can have the same totalizing effect as a judicial
decision, thereby squelching moral diversity just as effectively. Several
responses to this point exist. First, insofar as judicial decisions in this
area are constitutional ones, they are very difficult to overturn if courts
get them wrong. Legislative enactments have the virtue of quicker
reversibility, which allows for greater moral flexibility and for moral
growth over time. Second, there are reasons to suggest that legislatures
would more accurately reflect the moral positions of communities than
would courts, thereby making legislation a truer channel through which
moral diversity can flow. While electoral politics are assuredly flawed-
126. Gutmann and Thompson, supra note 119, at 86-87.
127. Id. at 77.
128. Loder, supra note 121, at 854.
129. Mark Hager, Why the Boy Scout Case Was Rightly (But Wrongly) Decided, 35
CONN. L. REV. 129, 150 (2002).
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compromised as they may be by lobbyists, interest groups, campaign
money and problems of scale-they are nonetheless more democratic
and more accountable to the electorate than are unelected federal judges.
As Sadurski notes, "[A]ssuming a well-functioning democracy, the
presumption that, by and large, legislators are responsive to the moral
sentiments in the community seems well founded."' 3 Third, differences
exist between local legislators codifying morals and judges imposing
moral views on the population. Especially in regards to the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence, judicial moralizing has a widespread effect, which
may be regional or national in scope. Local legislatures, by contrast,
affect only smaller political units, thus ensuring that mistakes are
confined. Finally, laws that are the product of smaller political units
offer a greater hope of assent than those embracing a more widespread
population. As Andrei Marmor observes, "At least from the vantage
point of respect for value pluralism, a regular democratic process, that is,
basically a majority vote, has this moral advantage: It is importantly
egalitarian."'' 31 If morality is virtually unavoidable in the law, then it
makes sense to leave this codification to the most flexible, localized
government units possible, which are local legislatures rather than
centralized courts.
B. The Perils of Constitutionalism
The Constitution, wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is made for
people of fundamentally differing views."' 32 It is also "a means for
peaceable collaboration in the face of intractable moral difference."'
' 33
However, as discussed above, constitutional decisions often attempt to
impose a uniform morality, resting legal decisions on moral grounds that
may not allow moral diversity to express itself sufficiently through law.
This outcome occurs whenever the Supreme Court or some lower federal
court either rejects local morality as a basis for state action or substitutes
its own moral views for those of the legislature or electorate. The
constitutionalization of morality in such cases is inimical to moral
diversity and is therefore morally and politically suspect. Understanding
the perils of constitutionalism can help to assess more clearly "the threat
that unmediated state power poses to moral diversity.,
134
130. Sadurski, supra note 73, at 350.
131. MARMOR, supra note 99, at 101.
132. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
133. Engelhardt, supra note 107, at 262.
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Over the course of the last century, constitutional adjudication has
had a homogenizing influence on American life, particularly regarding
questions of civil rights, which often invoke moral issues. The rules
proclaimed by the courts have regional or national application, which
tends to push all local governments in the same direction with respect to
what they may or must do in promulgating laws in areas of moral
dimension. By entrenching a judicially desired moral response in
constitutional law, the courts solidify their preferred moral regime at the
expense of local expressions of morality. Andrei Marmor observes,
"Constitutional entrenchment of values, or of conceptions of the right
and the good, necessarily favors certain conceptions over others by
essentially shielding some favored moral-political conceptions from the
democratic decision-making process. It is very difficult to see how this
shielding is compatible with respect for pluralism."' 35  Kimberly
Hendrickson makes the point more succinctly: "Federal courts have
been active in stamping out moral diversity in the pursuit of national
ideals, at least since Reconstruction.',
136
Consequently, many of the benefits of moral diversity are being
eroded or lost. Michael Perry expresses a sentiment typical of those who
support this trend toward uniformity:
As a practical matter, the public welfare limit calls for a national and
not a local standard for determining the scope of the public morals.
Of course, the constitutional basis of the limit, the fourteenth
amendment, is national in its operation. But beyond that, it simply
would not do to have one constitutional rule for abortion legislation
in California and another in, say, Rhode Island.'
37
Perry does not explain why this "simply would not do," nor do most
other proponents of national uniformity. Is variation really so distasteful
in a federal system? After all, society tolerates a wide variety of laws in
the commercial realm and in civil areas such as tort law. Why should
laws with moral dimension be any different? In light of the various
benefits of moral diversity, why should society be subject to a unifying
morality based on a perceived constitutional mandate?
To the contrary, there are several reasons why society should not
tolerate any tendency toward moral homogeneity. First, as noted
above, 138 there are various benefits of moral diversity. The more
morality is centralized, the more society will lose the social flexibility,
135. MARMOR, supra note 99, at 100.
136. Hendrickson, supra note 2, at 106.
137. Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals and the Police Power: The Ethical
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 732 n.201 (1976).
138. See discussion supra Part V.A.
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political stability, and individual moral opportunity that moral diversity
can provide. Lacking these ideals, society will drift farther from classic
liberalism toward a sort of moral totalitarianism.
Further, the centralization-that is, the constitutionalization of
morals-may actively discourage the kinds of moral growth that moral
diversity can bring, both in the individual and within political units. To
the extent that courts dictate moral positions of law, there is little reason
for the populace to grapple with the relevant moral questions. Simply
put, why should society engage in moral thought and dialogue if the
courts are going to do the thinking for it? "[N]ot only do Supreme Court
opinions contain little serious moral reflection, but they serve as an
excuse for dispensing with moral reflection at other levels of
government.... Constitutional adjudication is not a supplement to
moral-political deliberation; it is often a substitute.'' 39 As discussed
above, the loss of localized moral deliberation exacts costs in political
conflict and a stultifying of individual moral sense.
This point is not a full-scale attack on judicial review, a matter well
outside the scope of this article. With respect to moral diversity,
however, it is uncertain whether judges are better suited than the people
or their elected representatives to make moral decisions. Judges are
rarely appointed or elected for their moral wisdom; more often, judges
are chosen for their political connections, practical acceptability to some
Senate members, or legal acumen. To find this process acceptable as a
source of moral rights and principles makes it necessary "to assume
that... we can be sufficiently confident that a judicial determination of
those rights and principles is going to yield better results than its
democratic alternative. Evidence for such an assumption is sparse.
In fact, it requires a degree of prescience not normally associated with
human nature to think that people can know in advance when democracy
will get it wrong and judges will get it right.1 4 1 According to Marmor, a
presumption in favor of democratic action is "importantly egalitarian,'
142
and it is more consistent with liberalism and a "moral concern about the
need to respect value pluralism. 1 43 If the author may to dare dream a
democratic dream, "it is ... possible that citizens do not need
constitutional ideals or constitutional text to pursue their preferred views.
Perhaps their own ideals will do the trick."'
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The benefits of moral diversity and the perils of judicial moralizing
suggest that courts should treat the expression of morality as a legitimate
government interest to foster such diversity and limit judicial
centralization. This idea dovetails with the well-known rational basis
scrutiny standard, the default level of scrutiny for reviewing government
action, under which courts will uphold a law unless its challenger can
show that it is not rationally related to some legitimate government
interest.
Two difficulties are now left to discuss. First, how will courts know
when a law is an expression of morality sufficient to trigger this
deferential review? Second, how will this rule prevent the oppression of
minorities? As to the first question, the glib answer might be that courts
will know it when they see it. To cite an extreme example, an ordinance
imposing weight limits on trucks obviously does not have the same
moral content as a law forbidding polygamy. Generally, judges and
citizens will be able to distinguish a morals law from another type of law.
When the distinction is less clear, the risk of error is minimal. Absent
some clear legal defect, such as discrimination against a legally protected
class, 145 these instances are likely to involve laws in which reasonable
people might differ. Withholding judicial action still leaves open the
safety valve of further democratic action. If citizens demand a more
precise accounting, the purpose of the law can be discerned in several
other ways, consistent with current legal practices. One method would
be to examine the legislative history, which may reveal evidence of
legislative intent.146 Another would be to rely on inferences drawn from
the plain language of the statute as to its actual purpose. A third method
would be to look to any plausible purpose that can be derived from the
face of the law or the arguments of counsel, which is the most common
practice in cases under rational basis review.147 At any rate, the courts
have experience dealing with questions of purpose, whether that purpose
is a moral one or something else.
A more pressing question, though, is what to do when faced with a
situation like Romer: a law that relies on ostensibly moral concerns as a
cover for animus against a disadvantaged group that society might wish
to protect. The next section will discuss some potential solutions.
C. The Protection of Minorities
This article proposes that rational basis review is and should remain
the default standard of review, even in cases of morality-based state
145. See infra Part V.C.
146. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
147. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
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action. 148 However, there should be three exceptions that would justify
heightened review: (1) the law on its face violates "a specific prohibition
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments," (2) the
law "restricts the political process which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," or (3) the law is directed at
particular "religious," "national," "racial," or "discrete and insular"
minorities. 149 This article will not discuss the first category in detail
because that category is more easily identified than the second two.
Moreover, the second concept, that of political disenfranchisement, has
been well explored by John Hart Ely, among others. 150  Thus, the
remainder of this article will focus on the third category: laws directed at
minorities of various kinds.
The first three types of minorities are readily identified: racial,
religious, and national, which may be taken to mean "ethnic." One
might quibble about whether a group or a person is actually of a
particular ethnicity or race,I5 1 or whether a particular belief system truly
qualifies as a "religion,"1 52 but it seems an uncontroversial proposition to
say that generally such minorities should be protected. It is part of our
"constitutional tradition" to do so.' 53
In terms of the present discussion, however, it seems evident that
some morality-based state action could be used to improperly
disadvantage certain minorities. Which groups should receive extra
protection? That is, which groups are "discrete and insular," and what do
those terms mean? The New Oxford American Dictionary defines
"discrete" as "individually separate and distinct."'154  The American
Heritage Dictionary describes it as "constituting a separate thing. 155
Note that these definitions are not terribly helpful. Taking "distinct" as a
synonym, one could argue that almost any identifiable minority could
claim the title. Child molesters and Ponzi schemers are "distinct" from
most people, but no one would suggest giving them special protections.
Defining "insular" does not provide any further clarification. The New
Oxford American Dictionary defines "insular" as "ignorant of or
148. Much of what follows is drawn from the famous footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products Co. See United States v. Carolene Products. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938). The author must also acknowledge the influence of Wojciech Sadurski's
book, Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality, particularly chapter five. See WOJCIECH
SADURSKI, MORAL PLURALISM AND LEGAL NEUTRALITY 133-48 (1990).
149. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
150. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
151. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
152. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
153. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1996).
154. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 483.
155. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 516 (4th ed.
2006).
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uninterested in cultures, ideas or peoples outside one's own
experience," 156 while the American Heritage Dictionary defines the word
as "suggestive of the isolated life of an island."' 57 If one takes Justice
Harlan's words literally, then, "discrete and insular" means distinct,
willfully ignorant, or provincial groups. This interpretation hardly seems
helpful in determining who should receive constitutional protection.
Something more metaphorical is therefore required, and here one
should consider the spirit of footnote four in United States v. Carolene
Products.158 Footnote four states:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.... It is unnecessary to consider
now whether legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation .... Nor need we inquire whether similar
considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular
religious ... or national ... or racial minorities ... whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
159
It may be that the words "discrete and insular" were not chosen with
dictionary precision, but are instead meant to designate powerlessness: a
propensity for being taken advantage of in ways that are inimical to our
liberal respect for alternative behaviors, characteristics, and visions of
the world. The idea of insularity also implies an inability or
unwillingness to muster popular support for a group's own cause,
thereby leading to easier victimization by the majority.
Such a reading of footnote four suggests that "discrete and insular"
is synonymous with "respectable and powerless." In this context, then,
"respectable" means deserving of the respect we accord others in our
liberal, morally diverse society. For example, such a reading would
156. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 875.
157. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note
155, at 909.
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exclude child molesters and Ponzi schemers, but would include Nazis,
Communists, and the mentally disabled. 160 The author does not suggest
that these things are equivalent, but rather that they are all deserving of
some respect and tolerance if society is to be truly pluralistic and
protective.1
6 1
The point is not to render an undisputable list of protected
categories. Instead, it is to suggest that there is warrant in the law, and in
a system of liberal morality, for constitutionalizing the treatment of
certain groups, provided that courts can determine exactly what those
groups are to be. Thus, the regime that the author proposes will not give
entirely free play to majorities, though it might tend to do so in the
"normal" case. In this view, the result in Romer was correct because
gays and lesbian are a "discrete and insular minority," whereas the result
in Roe was incorrect because women are not a minority, much less a
"discrete and insular" one.
VI. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, moral diversity yields numerous moral benefits
to individuals and to the society that they constitute. To resist the
proliferation of moral diversity is to deny that we are a pluralistic
society. If we are to remain true to our liberal commitments, we must
acknowledge-and accept-that the world is full of matters on which
people of reason and good will are apt to disagree. A productive moral
diversity then may flourish, to the betterment of each of us and our
society.
The law, however, has trod a more dangerous road, threatening to
suppress diverse responses to moral issues through a homogenizing
constitutionalism. If society is to retain the social and personal benefits
of moral diversity, society will need to be attentive to the points at which
the law impedes it, as well as to the opportunities in law for sustaining it.
The author hopes that this article provides at least a starting point for
further dialogue on this important issue.
160. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
161. Perhaps more controversially, the author thinks this logic would also rule with
respect to gays, lesbians, and transsexuals. However, this subject is worthy of another
article.

